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ABSTRACT
Fraud is an illegal activity that affects the organizations and the global 
economy at large. Surveys and reports by leading audit firms such as ACFE, 
Deloitte, KPMG and NFA have confirmed that the public sector is more 
vulnerable to fraud compared to the private sector.  Comments in the Auditor 
General’s (AG) Report 2012 concluded the same findings. Thus, with respect 
to fraud, detection, investigation, and preventive measures are extremely 
important. While anomalies or red flags act as indicators for the auditor, 
management and other responsible parties to investigate whether there 
is real fraud, auditing and statistics remain as the two primary strategies 
for detecting fraud. Taking this perspective, Benford’s Law is an advanced 
digital analysis useful in uncovering anomalies. This paper evaluates 500 
accounting data from public sector agencies in Malaysia using the First-
Digit, Second-Digit, First-TwoDigit, First-ThreeDigit and Last-TwoDigit 
tests. Results show that Benford’s analysis is a credible analytical tool in 
identifying and detecting suspicious accounts for further scrutiny of fraud 
incidences in the public sector. This study represents an initial effort to 
derive a tool to monitor and detect potential fraud incidences or trends, 
thereby enabling organizations to curb tendencies toward fraud and thus 
pilot an initiative towards an effective management of fraud risk exposure.
Keyword: Accounting Anomalies, Benford’s Law, Fraud Risk, Public Sector, 
Statistical Analysis
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INTRODUCTION
Fraud transcends borders and is a global phenomenon. As fraud involves 
deception and dishonesty, it could, therefore, behave as a virus scourge 
among entities, either business or administration. No industry or organization 
is immune to such a scourge. The consequences of fraud constitute both 
financial and non-financial as fraud impacts revenue, profit, branding, 
and reputation; which, in a business, can lead to a loss of market share, or 
ultimately complete collapse.
Thus far, no organizations have been able to screen themselves 
completely from fraud, be it from the private sector or the public sector. This 
is simply because such behavior or conduct by its nature can be difficult to 
detect. The incidence of fraud in the public and government agencies appears 
to be rising and this is a genuine cause for worry. This is supported by the 
findings from Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, National Fraud Authority (NFA), 
PwC, Zurich Municipal and the Accountant-General’s reports from various 
countries. The findings show that fraud in the public sector is a real issue, 
with the majority of public sector leaders recognizing that major incident 
risks will increase over the next three years (Zurich Municipal, 2012; Said, 
Alam & Khalid, 2016).
Federal, State, and Local Governments as well as other Government 
Agencies play significant roles to deliver key services to the general public. 
National economies commonly have public expenditure as a significant 
component of the gross domestic product (GDP), expenditure that is 
mainly generated from public sector entities. It is therefore incumbent 
for accounting data taken from the ledgers, journals and spreadsheets 
that support a financial statement from the public sector agencies to be 
maintained properly with the use of appropriate systems. Ironically, given 
the current climate, public sector agencies are hard-pressed to reduce and 
justify their expenditure. The negative financial and reputational impact of 
any fraud affecting public sector bodies will be heightened since society 
is less tolerant towards this unethical behavior (Abd Aziz, Said & Alam, 
2015). The organization must ensure continuous growth while keeping the 
public trust.  
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Fraud is often presaged by accounting anomalies. Within this context, 
Benford’s Law as an advanced digital analysis technique, is commonly used 
to identify frauds involving insurance claims (Lu & Boritz, 2005); credit card 
frauds, money laundering, telecommunications, computer intrusion (Bolton 
& Hand, 2002); tax evasion, employee expense reports, invoices, accounts 
receivable, accounts payable and also fixed asset records. Conformity Test 
(da Silva & Carreira, 2013), or Test of Reasonableness (Nigrini, 2011), is 
employed to verify whether the analyzed data set follows Benford’s Law. 
The most common tests are First-Digit, Second-Digit, First-Two-Digit 
and Last-Two- Digit tests (Durtschi, Hillison, & Pacini, 2004; Nigrini & 
Mittermaier, 1997). The First-Two- Digit test is more focused compared 
to the earlier tests. It primarily detects anomalous duplication of digits 
and possible biases in the data due to error, internal control structure (i.e. 
structure of approving authority), and/or psychological factors with respect 
to numbers. However, it is observed that previous studies use either one or 
two tests to identify and detect suspicious accounts, and most of them focus 
on First-Digit and/or Second-Digit tests only (Diekmann, 2007; Johnson & 
Weggenmann, 2013; Plaček, 2014; Shikano & Mack, 2011)a test against 
this distribution was used to identify fraudulent accounting data. This test is 
based on the supposition that first, second, third, and other digits in real data 
follow the Benford distribution while the digits in fabricated data do not. Is 
it possible to apply Benford tests to detect fabricated or falsified scientific 
data as well as fraudulent financial data? We approached this question in two 
ways. First, we examined the use of the Benford distribution as a standard 
by checking the frequencies of the nine possible first and ten possible second 
digits in published statistical estimates. Second, we conducted experiments 
in which subjects were asked to fabricate statistical estimates (regression 
coefficients. This study aims to employ five tests, namely the First-Digit, 
Second-Digit, First-TwoDigit, First-Three-Digit and Last-Two-Digit tests.
Although interest on Benford’s Law and digital analysis in detecting 
financial fraud is growing, there is still limited research on its application 
and efficiency (Bhattacharya, Xu, & Kumar, 2011)there has been relatively 
little academic research to demonstrate its efficacy as a decision support tool 
in the context of an analytical review procedure pertaining to a financial 
audit. We conduct a numerical study using a genetically optimized artificial 
neural network. Building on an earlier work by others of a similar nature, 
we assess the benefits of Benford’s law as a useful classifier in segregating 
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naturally occurring (i.e. non-concocted. Johnson and Weggenmann (2013) 
demonstrated the effectiveness of Benford’s Law in detecting data bias in 
smaller data sets from the US state governments. They used 450 summary 
financial data instead of actual accounting data that restricted the analysis 
to a macro level. Plaček (2014) on the other hand, applies Benford’s Law 
in detecting data manipulation in the Czech Republic’s governmental 
macroeconomic data. He tested the 2013 data using the First- and Second-
Digit tests. The z-stats showed significant deviation and he believed it was 
due to the economic structural shift instead of a poor quality of data. This 
study extended on this with the First-Two-Digit, First-Three-Digit and 
Last-Two-Digit tests.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature 
on fraud in the public sector setting and fraud detection using Benford’s 
Law. Section 3 discusses research method and data collection. Section 4 
presents discussions of findings while the last section concludes the paper. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Definition, Classification and Cost of Fraud
Unlike an error or mistake, fraud is deliberate, intentional, and more 
often than not, involves the purposeful concealment of facts. As suspicious 
activities, fraud embodies an intentional act of misleading or committing 
harm, ultimately to others, with the aim of securing an unfair or unlawful 
advantage (Albrecht and Albrecht, 2004; Hopwood, Leiner & Young, 2008; 
Rezaee, 2010). Fraud involves misconduct elements such as deception 
(Grabosky & Duffield, 2001) and dishonesty (Singh, 2011), and typically 
alludes to the senior management, along with other attributes such as intent, 
desire, risk of getting apprehended, breach of trust, rationalization, etc. 
(Ramamoorti, 2008). Fraud may include trickery and employing cunning and 
unfair means by which the victim is cheated (Albrecht & Albrecht, 2004).  It 
can also be committed in a variety of different ways, such as through mail, 
wire, phone, and the Internet, thus often making it undetectable. Fraudsters 
are prone to commit fraud probably as a means to fulfill their wishes for 
luxurious and extravagant lifestyles (Grabosky & Duffield, 2001; Nia & 
Said, 2015; Mustafa, Bakri, Mohamed & Said, 2017). Given the current 
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state where no industry is immune to fraudulent situations and the negative 
publicity that swirls around them, prevention and detection of fraud has 
become a major concern of many organizations.
Many classifications of fraud have been developed. However, the most 
common fraud classifications are corruption, asset misappropriation, and 
fraudulent financial reporting (ACFE, 2010; Rezaee, 2010; KPMG Australia, 
2012; Kranacher, 2010). Table 1 below summarizes the trends of fraud 
from 2006 until 2014 obtained from a Global Fraud Study conducted by the 
ACFE and published in their Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud 
and Abuse.  The report is based on the results of an online survey opened 
to 34,615 Certified Fraud Examiners (CFEs) globally.  The report gives 
an overall global picture of fraud and abuse without highlighting specific 
countries. The table shows although reported cases of asset misappropriation 
are high, the highest median losses are incurred by fraudulent financial 
reporting.
Table 1: Frequency and Median Loss from Fraud 
by Classification from year 2006 to 2014
Asset 
Misappropriation Corruption
Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting
Frequency 
(%)
Median 
Loss  
(USD ’000)
Frequency 
(%)
Median 
Loss  
(USD ’000)
Frequency 
(%)
Median 
Loss 
(USD ’000)
2006 91.5 150 30.8 538 10.6 2,000
2008 88.7 150 27.4 375 10.3 2,000
2010 86.3 135 32.8 250 4.8 4,100
2012 86.7 120 33.4 250 7.6 1,000
2014 85.4 130 36.8 200 9.0 1,000
(Sources: ACFE - Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse,Global Fraud Study 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014)
Globally, 34 percent of respondents surveyed reported that they had 
been victims of fraud in the form of economic crimes (PwC, 2011b). Gee, 
Button and Brooks (2010) found that the cost of fraud was previously 
measured inaccurately as data from both the private and public sectors 
were difficult to compile. However, the scenario has changed over the last 
decade. Fraud occurrence in the United Kingdom is estimated at around £14 
billion annually with almost half, i.e. £6 billion, due to fraud in the public 
sector (PwC, 2011b). The United Kingdom’s National Fraud Authority 
Annual Fraud Indicator 2013 estimated fraud loss in the public sector to 
MAR Vol 16 No. 2 Dec 2017.indd   77
78
MANAGEMENT & AccouNTiNG rEviEw, voluME 16 No. 2, DEcEMbEr 2017
be £20.6 billion. This estimated fraud loss comprised £2.6 billion in the 
central government, £2.1 billion among local governments, £14 billion 
lost through tax fraud and £1.9 billion lost via benefits and the tax credit 
system [NFA, Annual Fraud Indicator (AFI) 2013]. KPMG Australia (2012) 
indicated that fraud has cost respondents at least $373 million over the last 
two years. While KPMG Malaysia (2013) reported that only 26 percent of 
the respondents could quantify the exact amount of fraud loss which totaled 
RM2.407 million. One can surmise the total loss would be much higher if 
the percentage of respondents quantifying fraud loss was higher.  Reported 
fraud estimates have been characterized as representing the tip of an iceberg. 
Given the enormous scale of fraud, there must be appropriate and effective 
measures to tackle this issue. 
Fraud in the Public Sector
Fraud in the public sector has not gained much attention from 
academics and policy-makers as opposed to other types of crimes (Doig 
& Levi, 2009). The ACFE (2012) in their Global Fraud Study ranked 
government and public administration second after the banking and financial 
services in terms of victimized organizations. PwC (2011a) reported that, in 
Australia, on average, government and state-owned enterprises experienced 
a higher incidence of fraud than listed private entities. Surprisingly, the 
common types of economic crimes faced by the public sector are similar 
i.e. assets misappropriation, financial statement fraud, and bribery and 
corruption. 
Fraud in the public sector in Australia is reported to have increased 
to 46 percent in 2011 as opposed to 37 percent in 2009 making it among 
the top five targets for economic crimes (PwC, 2012). This proves that the 
public sector is viewed as an easy prey by white collar criminals, which 
resulted in increased number of fraud occurrences, in recent years. Fraud in 
the public sector directly or indirectly victimizes every citizen in the country 
when one considers that fraud is a whole-of-business issue, involving not 
just technology but people and processes. Public fund is involved which 
could instead be utilized to finance public programs, facilities, hospitals 
and infrastructure, among others. A key pre-condition in tackling fraud is 
the recognition that it is more prevalent than the current published figures 
indicate and incurs a significant loss of government revenue. 
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The public sector is faced with various types of fraudulent schemes, 
namely corruption, billing, skimming, reimbursement, payroll, and financial 
statement fraud (ACFE, 2012). Deloitte & Touche (2008) identified six types 
of fraud affecting the public sector: failure to adhere to the procurement 
procedure, collusion with external suppliers or creation of fictitious 
suppliers, abuse of expense policies, misuse of public assets for personal 
gain, misreporting of budgets to obtain funding, and overtime or contractor 
abuse. Fraud is perpetrated by people who find the criminal gain is worth 
greater than the risk of detection. The perpetrator can come from any level 
in the organization; from senior management whose authority makes him/
her easier to override controls, to a contract worker facing personal financial 
pressure, and hence to overcharge for work done. 
Fraudulent schemes often start small and become bigger as the 
perpetrator becomes bolder after escaping detection. Mazar, Amir, & Ariely 
(2008) and Kirchner (2010) reiterated people who have committed small 
indiscretions over time may gradually be tempted to commit acts that 
are considerably more unethical, transgressing previously acknowledged 
permission thresholds. Stimulating initiatives in tackling the economic 
downturn and cost saving plans were identified as an opportunity for the 
fraudster to engage in unethical behavior. On average, over two-thirds of 
the cases are committed by employees (PwC, 2012). The higher incidents 
of fraud perpetrated by internal parties signal the importance of preventative 
measure taken by public sector agencies. Proactive fraud prevention 
measures will help organizations identify weaknesses in their environment 
and reduce opportunities for internal fraud.
Among businesses and other organizations surveyed in Malaysia, 
44 percent have been victims of economic crimes in the last 12 months 
prior to the survey (PwC, 2011b). The direct cost of economic crimes to 
an organization can be difficult to determine. But in general, Malaysian 
respondents reported direct losses have increased. Economic crimes were 
also cited to have incurred significant collateral damages including damaged 
employee morale, brand reputation as well as business relationships. The 
statistics on the types of frauds in Malaysia is inconsistent. PwC (2011b) 
in a study on the private sector reports the most common economic crimes 
involved thefts or asset misappropriations (83 percent) surpassing bribery 
and corruption (34 percent) and financial statement fraud (27 percent). 
Economic crime is most prevalent in large organizations.
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KPMG Malaysia (2013) on the other hand points out that in the private 
sector, bribery and corruption (90 percent) is a major problem followed 
by general fraud (52 percent). The survey also shows that 42 percent of 
fraud incidents were within the range of MYR10,001 to MYR100,000. 
Surprisingly, 64 per cent of the respondents believed that paying bribes is 
common in Malaysia. Poor internal controls, lack of internal auditor skill, 
lack of fraud awareness and nature of business are identified as contributing 
factors to fraud incidents. Common motivating factors for such unethical 
behavior include greed and personal financial pressure.
The Malaysian Auditor General and specific reports of the 
Public Accounts Committee (PAC), among others have highlighted 
mismanagement of public funds by government agencies (Abu Bakar & 
Ismail, 2011). The AG report provides performance audit feedbacks to the 
Government and other stakeholders on the effective mobilization of public 
fund for the numerous government programs, projects and activities. The 
information includes planning, execution and monitoring in ensuring the 
desired outcomes are achieved. The AG report highlights many instances 
of poor management of programs or projects that lead to severe losses to 
the government as a result of extravagance, wastefulness as well as fraud. 
This indicates lower value being placed on public money, sometimes even 
involving unnecessary expenditure on the part of the government. These 
cases demonstrate accountability and integrity in the government structure 
is deficient thus incurring public criticisms.
Fraud Detection using Benford’s Law
The numbers of fraud cases are shocking, with over one-third of all 
frauds detected indirectly by ‘chance’ (Jans, Lybaert, & Vanhoof, 2009). 
ACFE (2012) asserts that initially most frauds are detected through tips as 
compared to other methods. Subsequently in 2014, the ACFE reiterated 
tips remained as the main detection of fraud. Employees and customers 
are the two important sources of tips. The Kroll Global Fraud Report 2013 
estimated that two thirds of the firms hit by fraud in 2012 cited an insider 
as the key perpetrator (Kroll, 2013). Other than that, it is believed that an 
increase in automation and the use of technology are helping in the fight 
against fraudsters (PwC, 2012). 
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Accounting anomalies often imply the presence of fraud as it includes 
irregularities in source documents, faulty journal entries, and inaccuracies 
in ledgers. To uncover a complex fraud, a thorough investigation of all 
possible scenarios is required. Thus, it is important to understand the various 
characteristics of an accounting system. Further, knowing and understanding 
the strategies that may be employed by an entity in detecting fraud is 
essential (Abdul Aris, Othman, Mohd Arif, Abdul Malek, & Omar, 2013). 
One of the techniques used is Benford’s Law which is explained below.
Benford’s Law
Benford’s Law is a digital analysis technique that examines the 
frequency of the digits in the data. A mathematical tool that proposes a 
probability distribution for first, second and other digits of numbers in 
data sets, it describes the sizes of similar phenomena as long as the sizes 
span multiple orders of magnitude (Cleary & Thibodeau, 2005). The law 
postulates that numbers in sets of data with low first digits, such as 1, occur 
with more frequency than numbers with high first digits, like eight or nine. 
Valid, unchanged data, free of exceptional transactions, will follow the 
projected frequencies. The introduction of Benford’s Law to the auditing 
and accounting literature have driven researchers since to use digital patterns 
to detect data anomalies. 
The Benford’s principle has been applied to different sets of financial 
data, to detect fraud in insurance claims, corporate income tax, employee 
expense reports, vendor invoices, accounts receivable, accounts payable 
and also fixed asset records. Benford’s Law makes fraud detection possible 
when it is known that real data correspond to the Benford distribution (Bauer 
& Gross, 2011). 
Audit software that incorporates Benford’s Law enables the 
identification of fraud and other irregularities in accounts payable, income 
tax forms, claims payments and other disbursements. Applying Benford’s 
Law to auditing elevates the process to a more complex form of digital 
analysis and affirmed level. It enables overall scrutiny of the account to 
check if the numbers are distributed according to convention. 
In the accounting fraternity, Benford’s Law application began to be 
conducted at the end of the 1980s to test the integrity or legitimacy of data. 
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Varian (1972) had initially suggested these procedures for social science 
data. In employing digital analysis to investigate earnings manipulation, 
two contemporary works are worthy of acknowledgement, namely Carslaw 
(1988) and Thomas (1989). Carslaw (1988) noticed earnings numbers from 
companies in New Zealand did not follow the expected distribution. More 
zeroes occupied the second digit position with fewer nines. This could 
possibly imply earnings would well have been rounded up. Thomas (1989) 
observed similar trends among firms in the United States. Nigrini (1996) 
extended Carlaws’ and Thomas’ work on earning manipulation, combining 
it with Benford’s Law to perform digital analysis in identifying tax evaders. 
Then, Nigrini and Mittermaier (1997) have outlined practical applications 
of digital analysis in testing sets of accounting numbers and case studies 
of training students. Subsequently, Drake and Nigrini (2000) extended the 
initiative by brilliantly detailing the use of Benford’s Law for auditing and 
thereafter pioneering the application of Benford’s Law to accounting in 
detecting fraud.
Data Analytical and Statistical Testing of Benford’s Law
The success of Benford’s analysis is dependent on the frequency of 
numbers forming a set or pattern. Hence, the data must be sufficiently large 
and the time frame sufficiently long to form a pattern. The Benford’s tests 
can be analyzed under collective and individual statistic. Collective and 
individual statistics such as Chi-Square Test, Mean Absolute Deviation 
(MAD) and z-statistics are the most common statistical tests (Durtschi et 
al., 2004) used by researchers. The statistical test compares the frequencies 
of the actual data and the data predicted by Benford’s Law. The magnitude 
of deviation reflects the level of conformity to Benford’s Law. Substantial 
deviation might suggest the possibility of fraud or fabricated data (Hill, 
1995). Nigrini (2011) added Kolmogorov-Smirnoff (K-S), Logarithmic 
and Mantissa Arc as alternatives to the statistical tests mentioned earlier. 
Given the varieties of the statistical analysis, Durtschi et al. (2004) 
outlined two underlying conceptual consideration when deciding on the 
effectiveness of Benford’s Law. First, the digital analysis becomes less 
effective as the level of contaminated entries vis-a-vis data size drops. 
Second, there are many instances reported in previous empirical studies 
identified as non-confirming yet do not contain fraud.
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Notwithstanding, the effectiveness of each of the statistical analysis is 
discussed in detail by Nigrini (2011). Z-statistics analyze the significant level 
of individual digit while Chi-Square, K-S and MAD analyze the entire set 
of data. Nigrini (2011) notes that z-statistics, Chi-Square and K-S testsare 
limited from what is referred to as the excess power problem. Only small 
deviations are overlooked when the data become large. Nigrini suggests 
the data size should contain around 2500 to 5000 records if z-statistics, 
Chi-Square and K-S are employed.
The utilization of MAD to eliminate the effect of data size is 
recommended as MAD ignores the number of records. Unfortunately, MAD 
does not offer an objective and statistically valid cut-off scores. Concurrently, 
Drake and Nigrini (2000) offer guidelines on critical values based on the 
results of 25 diverse data sets shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Conclusion and MAD Range for the First Digit and First-Two Digit
Conclusion
MAD Range
First Digit First-Two Digit
Close Conformity 0.000 to 0.006 0.000 to 0.012
Acceptable conformity 0.006 to 0.012 0.012 to 0.018
Marginally Acceptable Conformity 0.012 to 0.015 0.018 to 0.022
Non-Conformity Above 0.015 Above 0.022
Source: www.nigrini.com/ForensicAnalytic and Nigrini, 2011
RESEARCH METHOD
The existence of the fraud triangle elements - pressure, opportunity, and 
rationalization will expose an organization to fraud. This study adopted 
statistical analysis by applying Benford’s Law to assess the likelihood of 
fraud occurrence in the public sector setting (Nigrini, 2011). 
Sample Size
This study presents a case study involving a Malaysian public 
Institute of Higher Learning comprising various faculties and non-academic 
administrative departments. Transaction data from the payment system in 
the years 2009 to 2010 were gathered where 500 accounting data were 
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randomly selected to check on the possibility of finding anomalies. Hill 
(1995), as cited in Durtschi, et al. (2004) noted most data on accounting 
conform to Benford Distribution and as such, can be subjected to digital 
analysis.  Typical accounts comprise transactions that are outcomes of 
combining numbers. Data size is not a key factor since Benford analysis 
reveals peculiarities in an account.  The data set includes information and 
description of voucher numbers, amount and issuance dates. The strict 
confidential policy practiced by the public sector disallows the revelation 
of the case study subject. The study begins with familiarization of various 
workflows and guidelines issued by the Ministry of Finance governing 
payments made to the supplier.  
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
This section employs the five Digital Analysis Tests based on Benford’s 
Law, which are First-Digit, Second-Digit, First-Two-Digit, First-Three-Digit 
and Last-Two-Digit. 
First-Digit (1D) Test 
First-Digit (1D) test examines the conformity of the data set following 
the distribution of first digit as suggested by Benford’s Law. A close 
conformity implies the data follows Benford’s distribution and subsequent 
Benford’s test is applicable. The distribution of 1D test of the payment 
voucher is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Proportion of 1D Test of 500 Payment Vouchers
Visually, Figure 1 shows that the data set follows Benford’s Law where 
there is a steep slope from digit 1 to 4 vis-à-vis 5 to 9. It can be statistically 
tested using Chi-Square and K-S tests (Hill, 1995) and MAD (Nigrini & 
Mittermaier, 2001). This study employs MAD to analyze the magnitude 
of deviation or conformity to Benford’s Law. The result of 1D test shows 
that the data marginally fits Benford’s Law with MAD at 0.015 as shown 
in Table 3 below. All digits are below critical value (z = 2.575) except for 
digit “2”. It will be impossible for the data set to fit Benford’s Distribution 
perfectly. Hence, z-statistic is used to draw a significant line.
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Table 3: MAD Conformity with Benford’s Law
F1D Test
Digit Count Actual Benford’s Diff Abs Diff Z-Stat
1 141 0.282 0.301 -0.019 0.019       0.88 
2 118 0.236 0.176 0.060 0.060       3.46 
3 63 0.126 0.125 0.001 0.001       0.00 
4 51 0.102 0.097 0.005 0.005       0.31 
5 35 0.070 0.079 -0.009 0.009       0.68 
6 31 0.062 0.067 -0.005 0.005       0.35 
7 18 0.036 0.058 -0.022 0.022       2.01 
8 24 0.048 0.051 -0.003 0.003       0.22 
9 19 0.038 0.046 -0.008 0.008       0.72 
Total 500 1.000 1.000 0.000
0.015MAD
Second-Digit (2D) Test 
Similar to 1D test, Second-Digit (2D) test is conducted to test 
conformity to Benford’s Distribution. Figure 2 shows the proportion of 
second digit of payment voucher against Benford’s prediction. 
Figure 2: Proportion of 2D Test of 500 Payment Vouchers
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The result shows that the data set does not have a smooth downward 
slope. Hence, a linear trend line was drawn to test whether or not negative 
slopes exist. Interestingly, the linear trend line is close to the Benford 
distribution. Hence, it is concluded that the 2D conforms to Benford’s Law 
despite a high MAD of 0.028. 
It is observed that there is a spike at number 0 and the scarcity of 
number 1 which may be a result of budget maximization, discount given 
by the supplier, payment of prefixed allowance rate, or procurement fraud. 
However, 2D test alone is not sufficient to point to the right direction. Hence, 
First-Two Digit (F2D), First-Three Digit (F3D), and Last-Two Digit (L2D) 
tests were conducted and the results are discussed below.
First-Two Digit (F2D) Test 
First-Two-Digits (F2D) test shown in Figure 3 is employed to detect 
duplicate data and abnormal spike just below the internal threshold limit, 
which may be a result of fraud. Despite significant numbers of spike shown 
in the graph, the MAD score is low at 0.004 which implies that the whole 
data set closely conforms to Benford distribution based on the conclusion 
made by Drake and Nigrini (2000). However, individual assessment on the 
F2Ds using z-statistic highlights five F2Ds that exceed the critical value 
of 2.575 (Confidence Interval of 99%). The results are shown in Table 4. 
Figure 3: Proportion of F2D Test of 500 Payment Vouchers
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The test identified five abnormal F2Ds which involve 53 records. 
Given the limited data available, researchers were not able to map the 
record against material description, staff and supplier information to assess 
the possibility of fraudulent pattern. As such, the record will be compared 
against the following test before being considered for further audit. 
Table 4: Result of F2D Test
Digit
Actual Benford
Z-Stat
Count % Count %
40 17 0.034 5 0.011 4.836
20 23 0.046 11 0.021 3.697
24 19 0.038 9 0.018 3.265
25 18 0.036 9 0.017 3.105
11 7 0.014 19 0.038 2.672
In general, the government expenditure threshold is RM10,000.00, 
RM20,000.00, RM50,000.00, and RM200,000.00. Fraudsters may 
circumvent the higher approving authority by lowering the purchased 
amount just below the threshold. Should a fraudster employ this method 
to avoid detection, Benford result would show anomalies at digit “8”, “9”, 
“18”, “19”, “48”, and “49”. Analysis on F2D test result shows that there 
are no abnormal spikes below the internal threshold.
First-Three Digits (F3D) Test
The First-Three Digits (F3D) test was conducted solely to detect 
duplicate data that may arise from fraud. The result is shown in Figure 4. 
It is noted that Benford’s distribution moves towards normal distribution 
when placement value decreases or a combination of digit increases. 
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Figure 4: Proportion of F3D Test of 500 Payment Vouchers
The graph of F3D shows the data set contains many duplicate numbers 
and Table 5 provides the results of ten most deviated records.
Table 5: Ten Most Deviated Record Based 
on Z-Statistic Value in the F3D Test
Rank Digit
Actual Benford
Z-Stat
Count % Count %
1 400 15 0.030 1 0.001 18.966
2 250 8 0.016 1 0.002 7.131
3 500 5 0.010 0 0.001 6.176
4 249 7 0.014 1 0.002 6.040
5 396 5 0.010 1 0.001 5.344
6 247 6 0.012 1 0.002 4.939
7 496 4 0.008 0 0.001 4.633
8 900 3 0.006 0 0.000 4.601
9 464 4 0.008 0 0.001 4.437
10 800 3 0.006 0 0.001 4.280
Total 500 1.000 500 1.000
F3D Test was conducted to analyze repeated digits in the data set. 
Since the F3D graph is moving towards normal distribution, using the 
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critical value of z-statistic as the cut-off point is no longer recommended. 
The test revealed 86 records which exceeded the critical value of z-statistic. 
According to Nigrini (1994), seasoned fraudsters often get into the 
routine and in the end do not even try to invent authentic looking numbers. 
As a result, similar digit occurs more frequently compared to the natural 
digit. 
Given the large amount of anomalies detected, only vouchers detected 
by F2D and F3D were selected for further analysis, i.e. F3D 400 and F3D 
250. However, the above explanation is still insufficient to justify the 
significant existence of rounded digit. Further analysis is required to identify 
the relevant voucher for audit purposes.
Last-Two Digits (L2D) Test
The Last-Two Digits (L2D) test was performed to detect rounded 
decimal point and invented number. Benford’s Law is moving towards 
uniform distribution as the researchers move from first digit to last digit. 
Hence, an assumption was made that each L2D are equally distributed 
(probability of occurrence = 0.01). Figure 5 shows the proportion of L2D 
in 500 payment vouchers.
Analysis on the data shows that 86 percent of the payment vouchers 
fall under the least controlled procurement method i.e., direct purchase 
from unregistered supplier. Most items purchased under this method are 
consumer goods.The payment vouchers issued for the purchase of low 
value items can also be identified as retail or consumer goods. These items 
fall under competitive market where psychological prizing is employed. 
Hence, we are expecting significant spikes at second digit “9’ and last two 
digits “90”, “95”, and “99”.
Interestingly, almost half of the data set has the last two digits “00”. 
We also found that one-fifth of the data set contain second digit “0” causing 
a significant spike. The result suggests that the data contain significantly 
high intentionally rounded number. 
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Figure 5: Proportion of Last-Two Digit of 500 Payment Vouchers
Discussion
The findings of this study cover three components – conformity, 
duplicate and rounded decimal. The 1D and 2D tests examined the data 
conformity to Benford’s distribution. The data analyzed satisfy the two 
tests which indicate it is suitable to apply Benford’s Law. This concurs 
with the findings by Burke and Kincanon (1991), Thomas (1989), Carslaw 
(1988), Sentance (1973), Wlodarski (1971), and Benford (1938) which 
assume that in many cases non-manipulated accounting data will follow a 
Benford set. The tests present a counter-intuitive but nevertheless easy-to-
implement data mining technique where the primary objective is to examine 
the authenticity of a set of accounting data from an auditor or financial 
investigator’s perspective. A goodness-of-fit test with Benford’s law applied 
to an observed accounting data set cannot be considered conclusive, but 
it is one of several investigation tools that need to be utilized in detecting 
fraud (Kumar & Bhattacharya, 2007).
The second set, F2D and F3D tests were conducted to reveal any 
duplication. The findings indicate that there is duplication in the data set. 
Lastly, the L2D test was carried out to check on rounded decimal as a 
fraudster may not be too wise in violating numbers. The results suggest that 
there is a possibility of fraud since more than half of the data have “00” 
as the last digit, suggesting high intentionally rounded number. However, 
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limited access to the public data makes further analysis, interpretation and 
recommendation difficult.  The best indication is suggesting further scrutiny 
on the data set.   
As suggested by Busta and Weinberg (1998) analytical review 
procedures (ARP) may be used to improve the efficiency of audits as it 
compares expected relationships among data items to actually observed 
relationships using Benford’s analysis. This deviation can indicate potential 
manipulation and can be used to signal the need for further audit testing. 
ARP produces two different signals, with four different outcomes. Signal 
1 means more investigation is warranted. The first outcome is a correct 
signal if, in fact, the data being audited have been manipulated. Whereas 
the second outcome is an incorrect signal as the audited data maybe “clean” 
and does not require more audit effort. This normally resulted in Type I 
error. Signal 2 warrants for no further investigation. The third outcome is 
a correct signal if, in fact, the data being audited are “clean”. The fourth 
outcome is an incorrect signal if, in fact, the underlying data being audited 
have been manipulated. This “undetected fraud,” or “false negative” 
outcome is called a Type II Error. Undetected fraud may result in audit 
failure with substantial consequences. Combining ARP with Benford’s Law 
enables real-life investigation of dubious financial fraud (Bhattacharya et 
al., 2011)there has been relatively little academic research to demonstrate 
its efficacy as a decision support tool in the context of an analytical review 
procedure pertaining to a financial audit. We conduct a numerical study 
using a genetically optimized artificial neural network. Building on an earlier 
work by others of a similar nature, we assess the benefits of Benford’s law 
as a useful classifier in segregating naturally occurring (i.e. non-concocted. 
CONCLUSION
This paper demonstrates the use of Benford’s Law in detecting fraud as 
a prevention measure or to expand the premise for corrective actions. A 
sample of accounting data from the public sector was randomly analyzed 
to enlighten the readers. The findings conclude that Benford’s analysis of 
accounting data is a useful tool in detecting potential fraud occurrence. 
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Accounting frauds typically encompass organizational and business 
scandals stemming from a lack of disclosure and /or control of the 
management. Such scandals represent the ‘tip of the iceberg’, akin to visible 
failure, which may be legal or quasi-legal. These scandals are typically 
investigated by appointed government agencies, external auditors and fraud 
examiners. With more cases being unearthed, there is a need for a tool to 
identify the warning signals of fraud. 
There is increased awareness in the public sector that fraud may 
affect them; similar to the private sector. No organization in the world 
is immune from the fraud virus. The results from this study show that 
the accounts payables system may also be violated by the perpetrators to 
illicitly maximize their needs and wants. As mentioned earlier, the wish to 
live luxuriously and comfortably is one of the causal factors that increase 
the occurrence of fraud.
Statistical techniques have grown in terms of acceptance amongst users 
in identifying anomalies. This is proven with the outcomes of these statistical 
tests based on Benford’s analysis which led the researchers to conclude that 
a proper application of the analysis potentially makes it a useful tool to 
identify suspect accounts for further scrutiny. Benford’s analysis clearly is a 
credible analytical tool for auditors to detect fraud because it does not require 
aggregated data. Rather it is conducted on specific accounts using available 
accounting data. It can be very useful in identifying specific accounts for 
further analysis and investigation. It stands to reason that while such tests 
have many advantages, certain limitations must also be contemplated upon. 
Specifically, care must be exercised in interpreting the statistical results of 
the test to avoid any misleading conclusion. Benford’s analysis should only 
be applied to accounts that conform to the Benford’s Law distribution, and 
the auditors must be cognizant of the fact that certain types of frauds will 
not be found in this analysis.
In the final analysis, society is constantly in need of tools and 
techniques to boost surveillance, monitoring and identification of sinister 
acts perpetrated to take criminal advantage of current exposures and gaps. 
Audits have proven to be worthy of trusts and effectiveness to curb these 
mischiefs (Buang, 2008). However, the fraud activity would have been 
committed before it gets detected. Simply put, the damage has been done 
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followed by the reactive efforts to correct or curb the fraud and to absorb 
the destructive impact of the loss. Unfortunately, numerous fraud cases have 
culminated in closures or huge losses that has led to a complete shutdown 
of organizations, both public and private. It may then be prudent to adopt an 
outside-the-box approach by ‘nipping the bud’ off of the fraud tumor while 
still benign before further damage is done when it becomes malignant. This 
study can be seen to open up opportunities to uncover techniques to devise 
more effective efforts to curb the occurrence of fraud and to put a shackle 
on the unsavory stealth advantage currently exploited by fraud perpetrators. 
The application of analytical review procedures and establishing a forensic 
accounting department with the assistance of Benford’s Law may be seen 
as a viable vehicle in detecting fraud.
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